

## itself.tru Truth

1 Before we can discuss mathematical truth, we should begin with a discussion of truth itself.<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that this is obviously extremely incomplete. My aim is to give a sense of the subject via brutal (mis)abbreviation.

2 Of course, the study of truth cannot but be entangled with the study of the world as such (metaphysics) and of knowledge (epistemology). Some of the following theories presuppose or imply a certain metaphysical and/or epistemological theory, but which these are is controversial.

### Neo-classical theories of truth

3 The neo-classical theories of truth take for granted that there is truth and attempt to explain what its precise nature is (Michael Glanzberg. "Truth" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018). What are provided here are modern understandings of theories developed primarily in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### The correspondence theory

4 A version of what is called the correspondence theory of truth is the following.

**correspondence theory**

A proposition is true iff there is an existing entity in the world that corresponds with it.

Such existing entities are called facts. Facts are relational in that their parts (e.g. subject, predicate, etc.) are related in a certain way.

**facts**

5 Under this theory, then, if a proposition does not correspond to a fact, it is false.

**false**

1. For much of this lecture I rely on the thorough overview of Glanzberg. (Michael Glanzberg. "Truth" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018)

6 This theory of truth is rather intuitive and consistently popular (Marian David. "The Correspondence Theory of Truth?" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016. A detailed overview of the correspondence theory of truth.).

### The coherence theory

7 The coherence theory of truth is adamant that the truth of any given proposition is only as good as its holistic system of propositions.<sup>2</sup> This includes (but typically goes beyond) a requirement for consistency of a given proposition with the whole and the self-consistency of the whole, itself—sometimes called coherence.

8 For parallelism, let's attempt a succinct formulation of this theory, cast in terms of propositions.

A proposition is true iff it is has coherence with a system of propositions.

9 Note that this has no reference to facts, whatsoever. However, it need not necessarily preclude them.

### The pragmatic theory

10 Of the neo-classical theories of truth, this is probably the least agreed upon as having a single clear statement (Glanzberg, "Truth?"). However, as with pragmatism in general,<sup>3</sup> the pragmatic truth is oriented practically.

11 Perhaps the most important aspect of this theory is that it is thoroughly a correspondence theory, agreeing that true propositions are those that correspond to the world. However, there is a different focus here that differentiates it from

### coherence theory

2. This is typically put in terms of "beliefs" or "judgments," but for brevity and parallelism I have cast it in terms of propositions. It is to this theory I have probably committed the most violence.

### coherence

### pragmatism

3. Pragmatism was an American philosophical movement of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that valued the success of "practical" application of theories. For an introduction, see Legg and Hookway. (Catherine Legg and Christopher Hookway. "Pragmatism?" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Spring 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019. An introductory article on the philosophical movement "pragmatism." It includes an important clarification of the pragmatic slogan, "truth is the end of inquiry.")

correspondence theory, proper: it values as more true that which has some sort of practical use in human life.

12 We'll try to summarize pragmatism in two slogans with slightly different emphases; here's the first, again cast in propositional parallel.

A proposition is true iff it works.<sup>4</sup>

4. This is especially congruent with the work of William James (Legg and Hookway, ?Pragmatism?).

Now, there are two ways this can be understood: (a) the proposition "works" in that it empirically corresponds to the world or (b) the proposition "works" in that it has an effect that some agent intends. The former is pretty standard correspondence theory. The latter is new and fairly obviously has ethical implications, especially today.

13 Let us turn to a second formulation.

A proposition is true if it corresponds with a process of inquiry.<sup>5</sup>

5. This is especially congruent with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (*ibidem*).

This has two interesting facets: (a) an agent's active inquiry creates truth and (b) it is a sort of correspondence theory that requires a correspondence of a proposition with a process of inquiry, not, as in the correspondence theory, with a fact about the world. The latter has shades of both correspondence theory and coherence theory.

**inquiry**

The picture theory

Before we delve into this theory, we must take a moment to clarify some terminology.

States of affairs and facts

14 When discussing the correspondence theory, we have used the term fact to mean an actual state of things in the world. A problem arises in the correspondence theory, here. It says that a proposition is true iff there is a fact

**facts**

that corresponds with it. What of a negative proposition like “there are no cows in Antarctica”? We would seem to need a corresponding “negative fact” in the world to make this true. If a fact is taken to be composed of a complex of actual objects and relations, it is hard to imagine such facts.<sup>6</sup>

15 Furthermore, if a proposition is true, it seems that it is the corresponding fact that makes it so; what, then, makes a proposition false, since there is no fact to support the falsity? (Mark Textor. “States of Affairs” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*:

by editor Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016)

16 And what of nonsense? There are some propositions like “there is a round cube” that are neither true nor false. However, the preceding correspondence theory cannot differentiate between false and nonsensical propositions.

17 A state of affairs is something possible that may or may not be actual (*ibidem*). If a state of affairs is actual, it is said to obtain. The picture theory will make central this concept instead of that of the fact.

The picture theory of meaning (and truth)

18 The picture theory of meaning uses the analogy of the model or picture to explain the meaningfulness of propositions.<sup>7</sup>

A proposition names possible objects and arranges these names to correspond to a state of affairs.

See Fig. tru.1. This also allows for an easy account of truth, falsity, and nonsense.

**nonsense** A sentence that appears to be a proposition is actually not if the arrangement of named objects is

6. But Barker and Jago (Stephen Barker and Mark Jago. “Being Positive About Negative Facts?” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*: 85.1 [2012], pages 117–138. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00479.x) have attempted just that.

**state of affairs**  
**obtain**  
**model**  
**picture**

7. See Wittgenstein, (Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. by editor C. G. Ogden, given by O. Project Gutenberg. International Library of Psychology Philosophy and Scientific Method. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1922. A brilliant work on what is possible to express in language—and what is not. As Wittgenstein puts it, “What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.”) Biletzki and Matar, (Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar. “Ludwig Wittgenstein?” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018. An introduction to Wittgenstein and his thought.) glock2016 (), and Dolby. (David Dolby. “Wittgenstein on Truth?” in *A Companion to Wittgenstein*: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2016. chapter 27, pages 433–442. ISBN: 9781118884607. DOI: 10.1002/9781118884607.ch27)




Figure tru.1: a representation of the picture theory.

impossible. Such a sentence is simply nonsense.

nonsense

**truth** A proposition is true if the state of affairs it depicts obtains.

**falsity** A proposition is false if the state of affairs it depicts does not obtain.

19 Now, some (Hans Johann Glock. "Truth in the Tractatus" in *Synthese*: 148.2 [January 2006], pages 345–368. ISSN: 1573-0964. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-6226-2) argue this is a correspondence theory and others (David Dolby. "Wittgenstein on Truth" in *A Companion to Wittgenstein*: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2016. chapter 27, pages 433–442. ISBN: 9781118884607. DOI: 10.1002/9781118884607.ch27) that it is not. In any case, it certainly solves some issues that have plagued the correspondence theory.

"What cannot be said must be shown"

20 Something the picture theory does is declare a limit on what can meaningfully be said. A proposition (as defined above) must be potentially true or false. Therefore, something that cannot be false (something necessarily true) cannot be a proposition (*ibidem*). And there are certain things that are necessarily true for language itself to be meaningful—paradigmatically, the logical structure of the world. What a proposition does, then, is show, via its own logical structure, the necessary (for there to be meaningful propositions at all) logical structure of the world.<sup>8</sup>

21 An interesting feature of this perspective is that it opens up language itself to analysis and limitation.<sup>9</sup> And, furthermore, it suggests that the set of what is, is smaller than the set of what can be meaningfully spoken about.

8. See, also, ( Slavoj Žižek. *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism*. Verso, 2012. ISBN: 9781844678976. This is one of the most interesting presentations of Hegel and Lacan by one of the most exciting contemporary philosophers. pp. 25-6), from whom I stole the section title.

#### language itself

9. This was one of the contributions to the "linguistic turn" (Wikipedia. Linguistic turn—Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Linguistic%20turn&oldid=922305269>. [Online; accessed 23-October-2019]. 2019. Hey, we all do it.) of philosophy in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## The relativity of truth

22 Each subject (i.e. agent) in the world, with their propositions, has a perspective: a given moment, a given place, an historical-cultural-linguistic situation. At the very least, the truth of propositions must account for this. Just how a theory of truth should do so is a matter of significant debate (Maria Baghramian and J. Adam Carter. [?Relativism?](#) in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019).

perspective

23 Some go so far as to be skeptical about truth (Peter Klein. [?Skepticism?](#) in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2015. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2015), regarding it to be entirely impossible. Others say that while a proposition may or may not be true, we could never come to know this.

skepticism

24 Often underlying this conversation is the question of there being a common world in which we all participate, and, if so, whether or not we can properly represent this world in language such that multiple subjects could come to justifiably agree or disagree on the truth of a proposition. If every proposition is so relative that it is relevant to only the proposer, truth would seem of little value. On the other hand, if truth is understood to be “objective”—independent of subjective perspective—a number of objections can be made (Baghramian and Carter, [?Relativism?](#)), such as that there is no non-subjective perspective from which to judge truth.

## Other ideas about truth

25 There are too many credible ideas about truth to attempt a reasonable summary;

however, I will attempt to highlight a few important ones.

## Formal methods

26 A set of tools was developed for exploring theories of truth, especially correspondence theories.<sup>10</sup> Focus turned from beliefs to sentences, which are akin to propositions. (Recall that the above theories have already been recast in the more modern language of propositions.) Another aspect of these sentences under consideration is that they begin to be taken as interpreted sentences: they are already have meaning.

27 Beyond this, several technical apparatus are introduced that formalize criteria for truth. For instance, a sentence is given a sign  $\phi$ . A need arises to distinguish between the quotation of sentence  $\phi$  and the unquoted sentence  $\phi$ , which is then given the quasi-quotation notation  $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ . For instance, let  $\phi$  stand for snow is white; then  $\phi \rightarrow$  snow is white and  $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner \rightarrow$  'snow is white'. Tarski introduces Convention T, which states that for a fixed language L with fully interpreted sentences, (Glanzberg, ?Truth?)

An adequate theory of truth for L  
must imply for each sentence  $\phi$  of L  
 $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$  is true if and only if  $\phi$ .

Using the same example, then,

'snow is white' if and only if snow is  
white.

Convention T states a general rule for the adequacy of a theory of truth and is used in several contemporary theories.

28 We can see that these formal methods get quite technical and fun! For more, see Hodges, Gómez-Torrente and Hylton and Kemp.<sup>11</sup>

10. Especially notable here is the work of Alfred Tarski in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

**beliefs**  
**sentences**

**interpreted sentences**

**quasi-quotation**

**Convention T**

11. Wilfrid Hodges. ?Tarski's Truth Definitions? inThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: byeditorEdward N. Zalta. Fall 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018; Mario Gómez-Torrente. ?Alfred Tarski? inThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: byeditorEdward N. Zalta. Spring 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019; Peter Hylton and Gary Kemp. ?Willard Van Orman Quine? inThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: byeditorEdward N. Zalta. Spring 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019.

## Deflationary theories

29 Deflationary theories of truth try to minimize or eliminate altogether the concept of or use of the term 'truth'. For instance, the redundancy theory claim that (Glanzberg, ?Truth?):

To assert that  $\lceil \phi \rceil$  is true is just to assert that  $\phi$ .

Therefore, we can eliminate the use of 'is true'.

30 For more of less, see Stoljar and Damnjanovic.<sup>12</sup>

## Language

31 It is important to recognize that language mediates truth; that is, truth is embedded in language. The way language in general affects theories of truth has been studied extensively. For instance, whether the truth-bearer is a belief or a proposition or a sentence—or something else—has been much discussed. The importance of the meaning of truth-bearers like sentences has played another large role. Theories of meaning, like the picture theory presented above, are often closely intertwined with theories of truth.

32 One of the most popular theories of meaning is called the theory of use:

For a large class of cases of the employment of the word "meaning" – though not for all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (L. Wittgenstein, P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Philosophical Investigations. Wiley, 2010. ISBN: 9781444307979)

This theory is accompanied by the concept of language-games, which are loosely defined as

**redundancy theory**

12. Daniel Stoljar and Nic Damnjanovic. ?The Deflationary Theory of Truth? inThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: byeditorEdward N. Zalta. Fall 2014. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014.

**truth-bearer**

**meaning**

**theory of use**

**language-games**



rule-based contexts within which sentences have uses. The idea is that the meaning of a given sentence is its use in a network of meaning that is constantly evolving. This view tends to be understood as deflationary or relativistic about truth.

Metaphysical and epistemological considerations

33 We began with the recognition that truth is intertwined with metaphysics and epistemology. Let's consider a few such topics.

34 The first is metaphysical realism, which claims that there is a world existing objectively: independently of how we think about or describe it. This "realism" tends to be closely tied to, yet distinct from, scientific realism, which goes further, claiming the world is "actually" as science describes, independently of the scientific descriptions (e.g. there are actual objects corresponding to the phenomena we call atoms, molecules, light particles, etc.).

35 There have been many challenges to the realist claim (for some recent versions, see Khlentzos<sup>13</sup>) put forth by what is broadly called anti-realism. These vary, but often challenge the ability of realists to properly link language to supposed objects in the world.

36 Metaphysical idealism has been characterized as claiming that "mind" or "subjectivity" generate or completely compose the world, which has no being outside mind. Epistemological idealism, on the other hand, while perhaps conceding that there is a world independent of mind, claims all knowledge of the world is created through mind and for mind and therefore can never escape a sort of mind-world gap.<sup>14</sup> This epistemological idealism has been highly influential since the work of Immanuel Kant (I. Kant, P. Guyer and

**metaphysical realism**

**scientific realism**

13. Drew Khlentzos. "Challenges to Metaphysical Realism?" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016.

**anti-realism**

**Metaphysical idealism**

**Epistemological idealism**

14. These definitions are explicated by Guyer and Horstmann. (Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann. "Idealism?" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018)

A.W. Wood. Critique of Pure Reason. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN: 9781107268333) in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, which ushered in the idea of the noumenal world in-itself and the phenomenal world, which is how the noumenal world presents to us. Many have held that phenomena can be known through inquiry, whereas noumena are inaccessible. Furthermore, what can be known is restricted by the categories pre-existent in the knower.

noumenal world

phenomenal world

37 Another approach, taken by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Paul Redding. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: by editor Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018) and other German idealists following Kant, is to reframe reality as thoroughly integrating subjectivity (G.W.F. Hegel and A.V. Miller. Phenomenology of Spirit. Motilal Banarsidass, 1998. ISBN: 9788120814738; Slavoj Žižek. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Verso, 2012. ISBN: 9781844678976. This is one of the most interesting presentations of Hegel and Lacan by one of the most exciting contemporary philosophers.); that is, "everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject." A subject's proposition is true inasmuch as it corresponds with its Notion (approximately: the idea or meaning for the subject). Some hold that this idealism is compatible with a sort of metaphysical realism, at least as far as understanding is not independent of but rather beholden to reality (Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism*, p. 906 ff.).

Notion

38 Clearly, all these ideas have many implications for theories of truth and vice versa.

Where this leaves us

39 The truth is hard. What may at first appear to be a simple concept becomes complex upon analysis. It is important to recognize that we have only sampled some highlights of the theories of truth. I recommend further study of this fascinating topic.

40 Despite the difficulties of finding definitive grounds for understanding truth, we are faced with the task of provisionally forging ahead. Much of what follows in the study of mathematics makes certain implicit and explicit assumptions about truth. However, we have found that the foundations of these assumptions may themselves be problematic. It is my contention that, despite the lack of clear foundations, it is still worth studying engineering analysis, its mathematical foundations, and the foundations of truth itself. My justification for this claim is that I find the utility and the beauty of this study highly rewarding.